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The effect of citizenship on the long-term earnings of
marginalized immigrants: Quasi-experimental evidence
from Switzerland
Jens Hainmueller1,2,3*†, Dominik Hangartner4,5,6*, Dalston Ward4,5*
We provide evidence that citizenship catalyzes the long-term economic integration of immigrants. Despite the
relevance of citizenship policy to immigrant integration, we lack a reliable understanding of the economic
consequences of acquiring citizenship. To overcome nonrandom selection into naturalization, we exploit the quasi-
random assignment of citizenship in Swiss municipalities that held referendums to decide the outcome of individual
naturalization applications. Our data combine individual-level referendum results with detailed social security records
from the Swiss authorities. This approach allowsus to compare the long-termearnings of otherwise similar immigrants
who barely won or lost their referendum. We find that winning Swiss citizenship in the referendum increased annual
earnings by an average of approximately 5000 U.S. dollars over the subsequent 15 years. This effect is concentrated
among more marginalized immigrants.
INTRODUCTION
Many countries have experienced sharp increases in the size and diver-
sity of their immigrant populations in the last decade, prompting gov-
ernments to reevaluate their immigration and integration policies to
accommodate the new arrivals and facilitate their integration into the
host country economy, society, and polity. Much is at stake in this pro-
cess. Successful integration opens the door for immigrants to econom-
ically benefit their host countries and strengthen their civil societies (1).
Unsuccessful integration can fuel social conflict and undermine cohe-
sion, given widespread perceptions that immigrants threaten their host
country’s culture, security, and social safety net (2, 3). At a personal
level, marginalization from the host country society and economy
imperils immigrants’ social, mental, and economic well-being (4, 5).
Central to integration is the issue of immigrants’ access to host-
country citizenship (6–10). Two viewpoints, which are sometimes re-
ferred to as the “catalyst” versus “crown” paradigms, structure debates
about citizenship policy (11, 12). The first paradigm holds that citizen-
ship is a catalyst for immigrant integration. Viewed from this perspec-
tive, obtaining host-country citizenship promotes the subsequent
integration of immigrants, because it inspires them to invest in a future
in the host country (11, 13), invigorates their political participation (14),
and reduces the discrimination that they face in the local labor market
(15, 16). The second viewpoint argues that citizenship is the crowning
prize for a successfully completed integration process (9, 17). Viewed
from this perspective, the integration requirements for naturalization,
such as mandatory language or country-knowledge tests, incentivize
immigrants to invest in integration. Once immigrants are awarded cit-
izenship, they have reached the end point of their integration process, so
we expect no effects of citizenship itself on subsequent integration (18).
While these viewpoints are not mutually exclusive, they often
serve as competing justifications for more liberal or restrictive cit-
izenship policies (11). If naturalization is a catalyst, then access to
citizenship improves immigrants’ integration outcomes. If natural-
ization is a crowning prize, then more restrictive citizenship poli-
cies with higher integration requirements are more beneficial,
because they motivate immigrants to invest in integration (9, 12).
In this study, we focus on the second of these viewpoints, that nat-
uralization fosters integration. Does gaining citizenship actually im-
prove integration outcomes? If so, then how long does it take for the
benefits of citizenship to materialize? In addition, how do the effects
vary across immigrant groups? While immigrant integration is a mul-
tidimensional concept, which can broadly be defined as the degree to
which immigrants acquire “the knowledge and capacity to build a suc-
cessful, fulfilling life in the host society” (19), we focus specifically on the
dimension of economic integration and, in particular, the long-term
effects of citizenship on immigrants’wages.While economic integration
is not the only important dimension of integration, it is often the focus
of prominent integration debates. Economic integration can also serve
as a stepping stone for other dimensions of successful integration (19).
In related studies, we examine the effects of citizenship on political and
social integration outcomes (11, 14).
Several studies focusing on the effects of citizenship on economic
integration demonstrate important links between naturalization and
immigrants’ short-term economic outcomes, such as wages and em-
ployment (13, 20–25). Yet, little is known about citizenship’s long-term
effects, despite their importance for policy. Two challenges stand in the
way of estimating long-term effects. First, we must isolate the effect of
citizenship from the two-stage selection bias that determines which im-
migrants apply for and receive citizenship (11, 14). This is challenging
because researchers typically cannot control for the myriad of un-
observed factors that lead immigrants to apply for citizenship and that
lead decision-makers to approve applications (11, 18, 26, 27). Second,
data constraints have largely prevented researchers from measuring
long-term effects of citizenship. Many studies rely on surveys that typ-
ically limit analyses to short-term effects and raise concerns about the
accuracy of self-reported earnings (28). In addition, studies that have
used register data, while including precise measurements of when im-
migrants receive citizenship, frequently lack information on whether
and when immigrants apply for citizenship, which makes accounting
for the two stages of selection bias difficult because one cannot control
for the important confounder of the motivation to apply.
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We address these gaps and provide causal evidence on the effects
of citizenship on the long-term earnings of immigrants. We leverage
a natural experiment in Switzerland, where somemunicipalities held
municipality-wide referendums on the citizenship applications that
met the eligibility requirements (including sufficient residency, a clean
criminal record, and economic self-sufficiency). Voters received a leaflet
containing detailed information about each application, including the
applicant’s name, origin country, gender, age, length of residency in
Switzerland, and language skills, and then cast a secret ballot to approve
or reject each application. An example leaflet is shown in fig. S1. Appli-
cants receiving a majority of “yes” votes received Swiss citizenship; re-
jected applicants kept their permanent residency status and could apply
for citizenship again, if they so chose.
This natural experiment allows us to apply two complementary
research designs to overcome the double selection bias: a regression
discontinuity (RD) design and a difference-in-differences (DD) de-
sign. In both designs, we remove the first-stage selection bias, from
nonrandom selection into the application process, by restricting the
analysis to successful and unsuccessful applicants. In the RD design,
which prior research has shown to have high internal validity and the
ability to replicate benchmark results from randomized experiments
(29), we compare applicants who narrowly won or lost their natural-
ization referendums to remove the second-stage selection bias. Suc-
cess in close referendums was largely decided by arbitrary factors,
such as current events, other referendums being decided at the same
election, or even the weather on the election day. Consequently, ap-
plicants who won or lost by just a few votes were similar on con-
founding characteristics, and comparisons of their postreferendum
earnings represent the causal effect of winning citizenship in the re-
ferendum. Figure S4 shows that most covariates, including prerefer-
endum earnings outcomes, are fairly balanced among narrowwinners
and losers, suggesting that in close referendums, citizenship is as good
as randomly assigned. For the DD design, we overcome the second-
stage selection bias by leveraging the panel dimension of our data and
compare the trajectories of pre- and postreferendum outcomes of suc-
cessful and unsuccessful applicants whose vote margins were within a
narrow margin. This allows us to examine whether the earnings trends
of winners and losers were similar before the referendum and then di-
verged afterward.
Our data combine detailed records from referendums and leaflets
that we extracted from municipal archives to identify all 4160 immi-
grants whose naturalization applications were decided in the 46 muni-
cipalities that used the secret ballot referendum process between 1970
and 2003 (30). From these records, we observe the number of yes andno
votes that each applicant received and the information available to
voters from the leaflets when they voted in the referendums, including
the applicant’s name, birth year, gender, referendum year, and origin
country. To measure applicants’ economic outcomes, we worked with
the Swiss Central Compensation Office (CCO) to match applicants to
records of their mandatory contribution to the Swiss pension system
[Old Age and Survivors’ Insurance (OASI)] on the basis of their name
and date of birth. CCO successfully matched 92% of applicants to the
OASI data; the match rate was roughly the same among close referen-
dumwinners and losers (fig. S2). The deidentified matched dataset that
we received fromCCO contains only the OASI information, birth year,
gender, referendum year, grouped origin country, rounded vote share,
and referendum outcome from the archival records. The grouping of
immigrants by origin country followed (31) and was conducted before
CCO linked the data.
The OASI data allow us to track the earnings of matched appli-
cants before and after their naturalization referendums, as all adults
between 18 and 64 (for women) or 65 (formen) years of age who live in
Switzerland are required to contribute a fixed percentage of their annual
income to the OASI. Our primary outcome is each applicant’s annual
total earnings from employment, measured in 2015 consumer price
index (CPI)–adjusted Swiss Francs (CHF; 1 CHF ≈ 1 U.S. dollar).
We do not count as earnings income from nonemployment sources
such as capital gains, pensions, scholarships, disability, or un-
employment benefits. Applicants whose only income in a given year
comes from these nonemployment sources remain in the sample—
we code them as having zero earnings. Further, we top-code earnings
at 200,000 CHF to limit the influence of outliers. We observe earnings
from 1981 through 2015. Our matched sample includes n = 3814 ap-
plicants and a total of n = 42,160 annual applicant observations. Details
about themeasures, sample, design, and statistical analysis can be found
in the materials and methods section.
RESULTS
Figure 1 shows the results from applying the RD and the DD designs to
the matched dataset. Winning citizenship in the referendum increased
the long-term earnings of these immigrants. The top-left panel shows a
placebo check for the RD design. We find no discernible difference in
the earnings of applicants who just barely won or lost their referendums
during the prereferendumperiod. In contrast, the top-right panel shows
that in the postreferendum period, applicants who just barely won
achieved higher earnings than those who just barely lost. The
bottom-left panel shows that the DD design yields similar results.
Focusing on applicants within a 40 to 60% yes vote range, winners’
and losers’ earnings trends were parallel in the 5 years before the refer-
endum but diverged in the years after. Applicants who became citizens
enjoyed sustained earnings growth; applicants who lost experienced
stagnation followed by earnings losses (in real terms) 11 to 15 years after
their referendums.
The bottom-right panel of Fig. 1 shows point estimates and confi-
dence intervals fromboth the RD andDDdesigns for the placebo check
on prereferendum earnings and for the short- and long-term effects of
winning the citizenship referendum. For the RD design, the estimates
are based on standard local linear regressions fitted to applicants who
won or lost by ±10 percentage points. There was no discernible
difference in the earnings of referendum winners and losers over the
5 years before the referendum (P = 0.614). Winning the referendum
increased average annual earnings by 2934 CHF for the 5 years
following the referendum (P = 0.335) and by 5133 CHF for the period
of 6 to 10 years after the referendum (P = 0.124). For the combined
10-year period after the referendum, the effect was 3635 CHF
(P = 0.202). In the subsequent 5 years (11 to 15 years after the refer-
endum), the effect on earnings was 8125 CHF (P = 0.033). Estimated
over the entire 15-year postreferendum period, the effect of winning
citizenship on average annual earnings was 5615 CHF (P = 0.047).
This amounts to an increase of approximately 13.5% over the aver-
age postreferendum earnings of narrowly rejected applicants.
The DD design estimates are based on standard panel regressions
with applicant- and year-fixed effects. The effect estimates were similar
to those from the RD design inmagnitude, but somewhatmore precise.
We foundno discernible difference in the earnings trends for the 5 years
before the referendum (P = 0.921), but winning the referendum
increased annual earnings by 710 CHF (P = 0.584), 3086 CHF
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(P= 0.182), and 6372CHF (P= 0.036) for the 0- to 5-year, 6- to 10-year,
and 11- to 15-year periods following the referendum. Across the first
10 years after the referendum, the effect of referendum success on
annual earnings amounted to 2841 CHF (P = 0.043). Over the entire
15-year postreferendum period, the effect of referendum success on
annual earnings was 4426 CHF (P = 0.004).
Our finding that the effect of winning the referendum grows over
time echoes earlier studies’ findings (21, 25) and points to naturalization
allowing applicants to attain higher wages in the long term.When com-
paring our estimates to those from studies in other countries, we should
keep in mind that many contextual factors such as the origin and skill
composition of the immigrant population, labormarket conditions, and
legal barriers to host-country citizenship may moderate the returns to
naturalization. Our estimate for Switzerland (years 1981–2015) is in the
range reported by previous studies that have estimated the effect of nat-
uralization over a 15-year postnaturalization period to be an ap-
proximately 7.4% wage increase in Germany (1975–2004) and a
38.1% increase in the United States (1979–91) (21, 25). For Germany,
Steinhardt (25) uses a linear growth model to estimate the annual wage
growth caused by naturalization to be 0.49% for each postnaturalization
year. Using the same model, Bratsberg et al. (21) get a corresponding
estimate of 2.54% for the United States. To make the estimates compa-
rable across studies, we multiply the annual wage growth reported for
Germany and the United States by 15 postnaturalization years.
Several checks support the robustness of the results including
changes to the inflation adjustment (fig. S5 and tables S7 and S8), ex-
cluding applicants with self-employment earnings (tables S9 and S10)
or with zero earnings through their pre- and postreferendum periods
(tables S17 and S18), including earnings measured after retirement
age (tables S19 and S20), changing the regression specifications (tables
S11 to S16), and varying the bandwidths for the estimation samples
(figs. S6 and S7).
Our designs identify the effect of winning citizenship in the natural-
ization referendum, i.e., an intention-to-treat effect. Because some ap-
plicants who lost their referendum subsequently reapplied and obtained
citizenship at a later date, our estimates are distinct from the effect of
obtaining citizenship. For the subset of applicants who obtain Swiss cit-
izenship if and only if they pass their first referendum,we could estimate
the effect of citizenship, i.e., a local average treatment effect (LATE), if
we made additional assumptions—notably, an exclusion restriction—
and obtained a reliable measure of when and if rejected applicants nat-
uralize so that we could compute a compliance ratio. Note that under
these assumptions, the LATEwould be strictly larger than the intention-
to-treat effect that we report here (32); hence, our results can be viewed
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Fig. 1. Winning citizenship in the referendum increases immigrant earnings in the long term. (A) Placebo test shows no significant differences in earnings
between immigrants who barely won or lost their citizenship referendum in the last 5 years before the referendum (n = 1337). (B) RD estimate shows sizable and
significant differences in earnings between immigrants who barely won or lost their citizenship referendum in the years after the referendum (n = 2262). (C) The 20-year
earnings trends spanning the time period before and after the naturalization referendum shows an increasing earnings gap between immigrants who won or lost
their referendum (applicants in 40 to 60% yes-vote range; n = 10,731). (A) to (C) show loess smoother and 95% confidence intervals. (D) Point estimates for the RD and
DD regressions and 90% (thick line) and 95% (thin line) confidence intervals.
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as a lower bound on the effect of citizenship. In the Supplementary
Materials, we provide approximations to the LATE by leveraging
data from a targeted survey of close referendum winners and losers
and the CCO’s indicator for naturalization, which is unfortunately
not updated regularly, tomeasurewhether andwhen rejected applicants
naturalized. Given the measurement errors of these variables, we
caution against overinterpreting these somewhat speculative approxi-
mations of the LATE and instead prefer the conservative intention-
to-treat effects.
What mechanisms explain the sizable long-term effect of winning
the citizenship referendum on earnings? One possibility is that the
earnings differences do not represent a positive effect of citizenship
but rather a negative effect of alienation felt by rejected applicants. Sev-
eral points cast doubt on this explanation. Losing the referendum did
not affect unsuccessful applicants’ permanent residency status, and they
faced no new restrictions to labor market access or the security of their
residence in Switzerland. Consistent with this, rejected applicants’ pre-
and postreferendumearnings are relatively similar (Fig. 1, A andB), and
we observe rejected applicants throughout the postreferendum period
at similar rates as accepted applicants (fig. S8). This suggests that losing
the referendum did not make themmore likely to leave Switzerland. In
addition, the difference in the earnings trend between accepted and re-
jected applicants grows rather gradually throughout the postreferen-
dum period, and there is no discontinuous effect in the immediate
aftermath of the referendum when an alienation effect would be
expected to be strongest.
Another possiblemechanism is that naturalization confers a sense of
security that allows for greater risk taking in the labor market and that
this eventually leads to higher earnings.We also view this explanation as
unlikely. All applicants, regardless of referendum outcome, had perma-
nent residency in Switzerland and equal access to the Swiss social secu-
rity system. It is therefore unclear why citizenship would incentivize
greater risk taking. Empirically, one implication of greater risk-taking
behavior on the part of successful applicants is that they would use un-
employment benefits at higher rates, as they becomemore selective dur-
ing job searches or take time away from the labor market to gain
additional skills. To test this argument, we can use the RDD and DD
designs to estimate the effect of winning the referendum on un-
employment frequency. Tables S25 and S26 show the results. Across
all specifications, we find no evidence that referendum success affected
unemployment frequency. This suggests that referendum winners are
not more likely to rely on unemployment benefits, contrary to the risk-
taking argument. At the same time, this null result also implies that the
benefits of passing the referendum for earnings, which are coded zero
for unemployment spells, are not driven by a reduction in un-
employment risk for winners. Part of this might be due to the fact that
unemployment is rather rare in our sample. Applicants’ average un-
employment duration is only 0.38 months per year.
Alternatively, citizenshipmay lead to higher earnings by reducing
the discrimination that immigrants face in the labor market. In
Switzerland, employers and employment websites typically expect job
applicants to report their citizenship, making citizenship status a visible
criterion that can factor into the screening of applications. Statistical
discrimination (33, 34) occurs when employers assume that non-
naturalized immigrants are, in general, lower skilled and less likely
to remain in Switzerland and then are less likely to hire, promote, or
invest in specific non-naturalized immigrants based on these assump-
tions. Acquiring citizenship, because it is costly and requires meeting
criteria regarding residency, economic self-sufficiency, and language skill,
sends employers a signal of successful integration and commitment to
permanent settlement in Switzerland (35). Alternatively, discrimination
against immigrants may be “taste based” (36), i.e., driven by employers’
prejudice and animus against particular origin groups.
If citizenship improves earnings by reducing discrimination in the
labor market, then we would expect citizenship to be more beneficial
to immigrants belonging to groups most often subjected to discrimi-
nation. Consistent with thismechanism, we find that when replicating
our analyses for different origin groups, the earnings gains from
winning the citizenship referendum are concentrated among immi-
grants from Turkey and Yugoslavia, whom previous research has iden-
tified as two of the most marginalized immigrant groups in Switzerland
in the period we study (31). Specifically, winning the referendum
increased these immigrants’ annual earnings by 10,624 CHF
(P = 0.003; RD design), while there is no discernible effect for immi-
grants from other countries (P = 0.957; RD design).
Immigrants at the lower quantiles of the earnings distribution, who
primarily work in low-skill jobs, comprise another group with a higher
likelihood of facing discrimination in the labor market (37). Figure 2
shows the effect of winning the citizenship referendumat three different
quantiles—25th, 50th, and 75th—of the earnings distribution. We find
that the gains in earnings from winning citizenship are largest at the
25th percentile of the earnings distributions. Quantile DD regressions,
reported in table S23, indicate that the annual earnings boost from nat-
uralization is stronger at the 25th percentile (2344 CHF, P = 0.002 for
0 to 10 years after the referendum and 3234 CHF, P = 0.001 for 0 to
15 years) than at the median (1310 CHF, P = 0.013 for 0 to 10 years
and 1704 CHF, P = 0.004 for 0 to 15 years) and at the 75th percentile
(283 CHF, P = 0.572 for 0 to 10 years and 733 CHF, P = 0.211 for 0 to
15 years). These results are consistent with the discrimination mech-
anism, suggesting that winning the citizenship referendum is most
beneficial for immigrants with lower earnings.
Besides earnings and unemployment, the Supplementary Materials
explore the impact of winning citizenship in the referendum on two
additional labor market outcomes: disability risks and early retirement.
Tables S27 to S29 present the results. We find no impact on retirement
behavior across model specifications, and only weak evidence for a
small effect on disability benefits: according to our DDmodel, winning
the referendum decreases the probability of receiving disability benefits
11 to 15 years later by one percentage point (P = 0.08).
DISCUSSION
We provide evidence that winning citizenship in the referendum im-
proves immigrants’ earnings over the long term. Leveraging a quasi-
experiment that compares similar immigrants who were divided by
just a few votes at the time of their naturalization referendum, we
found that those who barely won Swiss citizenship had higher earnings
up to 15 years later compared to thosewho barely lost their referendum.
This finding provides evidence that citizenship catalyzes immigrants’
long-term economic success, at least in the context of naturalization re-
ferendums in Switzerland. In addition, we find evidence that winning
the citizenship referendum particularly benefitted more marginalized
groups, i.e., immigrants from Turkey and Yugoslavia, and those with
lower earnings. These findings support the argument that citizenship
can alleviate some of the labor-market discrimination that impedes im-
migrant integration. Because of our design, our findings cannot speak to
benefits of naturalization for irregular immigrants or immigrants who
do not meet citizenship requirements.
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How should we consider the external validity of our findings? One
way to judge the external validity is to examine how the 46 ballot box
municipalities that are the focus of this study differ from other Swiss
municipalities. Table S32 compares the ballot box municipalities to all
other Swiss municipalities across a range of characteristics that poten-
tially affect immigrant integration, including population size, share of
foreign-born residents, naturalization rate, proportion of the labor force
working in the primary, secondary, and tertiary sectors, unemployment
rates for Swiss and foreigners, and vote shares for the populist right-
wing Swiss People’s Party across the study period.While we find that
ballot box municipalities are somewhat larger than the other muni-
cipalities, they otherwise resemble the rest of Switzerland. Although
our results are roughly consistent with other studies that have docu-
mented economic benefits of naturalization, external validity beyond
Switzerland is much harder to assess given the many cross-country dif-
ferences that may moderate the effects of citizenship. Future research
with similar quasi-experimental designs and register data from other
contexts is needed to better evaluate the long-term effects of citizenship
in other labor markets.
At a timewhen governments around the world are striving to design
policies that facilitate the integration of large and diverse immigrant
populations, our study shows that, at least in our context, awarding host-
country citizenship can create lasting economic returns. These returns
not only benefit immigrants themselves; they also can strengthen host
communities by increasing tax revenues and loweringwelfare spending.
While our study advances understandings of the causal effects of citi-
zenship, more work is necessary to identify its benefits in other contexts
and to evaluate the impact of lowering barriers to citizenship, such as
lengthy residency requirements, high naturalization fees, or lack of
information (38, 39). Also, our findings here can only speak to the effect
of citizenship given the current citizenship regulations. More work is
needed to determine the optimal level of citizenship requirements that
wouldmaximize the catalytic effects of naturalization andmaximize the
integration returns (11, 14).
MATERIALS AND METHODS
Institutional background
Standard Swiss practice is for citizenship applications to be decided at
the municipal level, with procedures for resolving applications varying
across municipalities (30, 31). Immigrants seeking Swiss citizenship
apply with their municipality of residence. We based our study on
the set of municipalities, which we call the ballot box municipalities,
that decided naturalization requests with secret-ballot referendums
(31). In the ballot boxmunicipalities, immigrants seeking naturalization
submitted an application to local authorities, who then checkedwhether
the applicant met the formal requirements. Eligible applicants then
had their requests voted on by the citizen population. Shortly before the
0
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Fig. 2. Effect of winning citizenship in the referendum is largest for lower earning quantiles. Comparing immigrants who barely won or lost their citizenship
referendum at the 25th, 50th, and 75th earnings percentile, point estimates and 95% confidence intervals show that the relative and absolute effect of winning
citizenship in the referendum is largest for immigrants with lower earnings (n = 10,731).
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naturalization referendums, resident citizens received official leaflets
with detailed information about each applicant, which voters could
use to inform their decision to approve or reject each application. See
fig. S1 for an example leaflet.
Applicants receiving a majority of yes votes were granted Swiss
citizenship. Applicants who did not win majority support could re-
apply again, although the length of the application process meant
that they typically would not have another referendum for some
years. See (11, 14, 31) for more details about the process.
Data
Webased our sample on data collected byHainmueller andHangartner
(31). They retrieved records of referendums and leaflet information
frommunicipal archives for all immigrants whose naturalization appli-
cations were put to public vote in all 46 ballot box municipalities be-
tween 1970 and 2003, when the Swiss Supreme Court struck down
the procedure as unconstitutional (30). In total, our sample from the
municipal archives contains n = 4160 applicants.
From the voting leaflets, we observed a set of prereferendum cov-
ariates. Because this is the same information available to naturaliza-
tion referendum voters, it is effectively the set of covariates that
determinedwhether applicants did or did not receive citizenship at their
referendum. This set included, among others, applicants’ birth year,
gender, referendum year, and origin country. We then connected the
leaflet measures to the percentage of yes votes received in referendums.
To add measures of pre- and postreferendum economic outcomes to
the sample, we worked with the Swiss CCO (Zentrale Ausgleichstelle)
to match applicants to records of their mandatory contributions to the
Swiss pension system (OASI, Alters- und Hinterlassenenversicherung)
from 1981 through 2015 on the basis of their name and date of birth.
CCO successfully matched 92% of applicants to the OASI data,
corresponding to n = 3 814 applicants and n = 42,160 annual applicant
observations. The match rate is balanced between close referendum
winners and losers (fig. S2) and is similar across values of the covariates
in thematched dataset (table S1). The deidentifiedmatched dataset that
we received fromCCO contains only the OASI information, birth year,
gender, referendum year, grouped origin country, rounded referendum
vote share, and referendum outcome from the archival records. To en-
sure data anonymity, we had to group immigrants by origin country
before CCO linked the datasets. For this, we followed the grouping of
Hainmueller and Hangartner (31). The data that we received from the
COO also include an indicator that allows us to measure whether (and
when) initially unsuccessful applicants eventually obtained Swiss citi-
zenship, but as we discuss below, this variable is not systematically up-
dated and is, therefore, affected by measurement error.
Statistical analysis
In our RD approach, we estimate effects by fitting linear regressions
specified as
Yi ¼ dt þ b1 above 50%þ b2marginþ b3 above 50%margin
þ ½covariates þ Di
where i indexes applicants, Y is one of our outcome variables, dt repre-
sents fixed effects for referendum year, b1 is the effect of winning the
naturalization referendum, [covariates] is our battery of covariates
(grouped origin, female, and a series of binary variables for referendum
age), and D is an idiosyncratic error term.We fit these regressions to all
applicants who were observed at least once after their referendumwith-
in a ±10% vote share margin, following the method for calculating op-
timal bandwidths introduced in (40).
A key feature of this design is the assumption that applicants could
not manipulate their referendum vote share. Figure S3 shows that the
density of applications is fairly smooth at the threshold, confirming that
applicants could not manipulate their vote shares. Because of the
rounding procedure applied to the vote shares, a formal McCrary den-
sity test is not feasible in our context. However, we can compare the
density of applicants at the 50% threshold. Among the applicants falling
into the 49.5 to 50.5% range, 52%were accepted and 48%were rejected.
A two-sided exact binomial test of equality of proportions shows no in-
dication of sorting (n = 69, two-sided P = 0.81). This test follows the
spirit of the sorting test for RD designs with discrete running variables
presented in (41), which the rounding structure of our running variable
does not permit us to implement exactly. As referenced above, we also
provide covariate balance tests for our RD design in fig. S4.
Another important feature of our design is that our running variable
“margin” has been rounded to the nearest integer. As shown in (42),
naive RD estimation with a rounded running variable can bias treat-
ment effect estimates when the relationship between the running vari-
able and the outcome has a steep slope or is nonlinear near the
threshold, and, further, b3 = 0 is a sufficient condition for ruling out
rounding bias. Our estimates (see table S6) do not allow us to reject
the hypothesis that b3 = 0, leading us to the conclusion that rounding
bias is not affecting our estimates. Note, however, that our estimates of
the returns to winning the referendum are onlymarginally smaller with
the correction proposed in (42).
For our DD approach, we estimate effects with linear regressions
specified as
Yit ¼ ai þ dt þ b above 50%i
 1ðcalendar year ≥ referendum yearÞ
it
þ Dit
where i indexes applicants, t indexes calendar years, ai is an applicant
fixed effect, dt is a year fixed effect, b is the effect of winning the natu-
ralization referendum, 1(calendar year ≥ referendum year) is an
indicator function that takes on the value of 1 the year of an applicant’s
referendum and all subsequent years and that takes on the value of 0 for
all prereferendum years, and Dit is an idiosyncratic error term. To ac-
count for errors that are correlated within applicants over time, we
cluster SEs by applicant.
The standard identifying assumption for a DD design—commonly
called “parallel trends”—states that there are no time-varying variables
that confound the relationship between treatment and potential out-
comes, i.e., between referendum success and postreferendum earnings.
While this assumption may be implausible across the full range of re-
ferendum vote shares, or in contexts that compare citizenship applica-
tions decided under more opaque procedures, it is plausible when
focusing on close referendums, where applicants are relatively similar
apart from their levels of referendum support. For this reason, we
restricted the sample for our DDmodels to those applicants with refer-
endum vote shares within a ±10% bandwidth around the threshold—
the same restriction that we applied for our RD models.
We further restricted the sample to applicants whomwe observed at
least once 5 years or more before their referendum, once in the 5 years
immediately before their referendum, and once after their referendum.
Because the DD effect is based on comparisons of earnings before and
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after referendums, these restrictions ensure that only applicants who
can contribute to estimating the effect of winning a referendum are
included. In addition, the restriction that applicants be observed at
least once 5 years or more before their referendum is made so that
we have statistical power to estimate the prereferendum trends in
earnings. This is necessary for evaluating the plausibility of the parallel
trends assumption (see prereferendum period in the bottom-left panel
of Fig. 1).
For our main analyses, we fitted six versions of our DDmodel. First,
we fitted a placebo model that tests the assumption of no time-varying
confounding. To do this, we restricted the sample only to observations
in the final 5 years before an applicant’s referendum and then consider
treatment uptake, i.e., the beginning of the postreferendum year period,
to have occurred in the final two prereferendum years. The remaining
five models all include the 5 years immediately before applicants’ refer-
endums (and code treatment normally) and cover the following post-
referendum year ranges: 0 to 5, 6 to 10, 11 to 15, 0 to 10, and 0 to 15.
Additional analyses, unless otherwise specified, use the full set of pre-
and postreferendum years.
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